Although the Hague Rules were never adopted in a treaty instrument, Lauterpacht states that they are regarded "as an authoritative attempt to clarify and formulate rules of law governing the use of aircraft in war and they will doubtless prove a convenient starting point for any future steps in this direction.,,2o At least insofar as the definition of "military objective" contained in the rules is concerned, Lauterpacht's prediction was, as we shall later see, prescient.
Although the international community undertook a major effort in 1949 to bring up to date the international rules for the protection of the victims of armed conflict, the project was directed primarily to the protection of the victims of war and did not include an attempt to modernize the Hague Rules or other conventions dealing with the means and methods of warfare. All governments and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts should conform at least to the following principles: ... that distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible.23
Soon thereafter the General Assembly of the United Nations became interested in the efforts of the ICRC and adopted a series of resolutions along the lines of Resolution XXVIII, the most significant, insofar as our subject is concerned, being Resolution 2675 (XXV). It stated that the General Assembly affirmed certain basic principles of the law of armed conflict, including:
2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all times between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations.
4. Civilian populations as such should not be the object of military operations. 24 These movements toward a codification of the principle of distinction and defining the military objective received further impetus from a resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at Edinburgh in 1969. This Resolution reaffirmed the "fundamental principle" of the obligation of parties to observe the principle of distinction and defined military objectives as only those objects, which, by their very nature or purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action, or exhibit a generally recognized military significance, such that their total or partial destruction in the actual circumstances gives a substantial, specific and immediate military advantage to those who are in a position to destroy them.25 The first is applicable to international armed conflicts and the second to non~international armed conflicts. Only the former is of interest to us in that it contains explicit provisions concerning the principle of distinction and the concept of the military objective.
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As a result of the deliberations of the CDDH, the international community has for the first time in a treaty document adopted a specific and explicit articulation of the principle of distinction and its derivative principle of the military objective. Additional Protocol I (as of September 1997) has now entered into effect for 148 States.
Although some aspects of the two principles are reflected in a number of articles in Additional Protocol 1,27 they are expressly set forth in two articles, Article 48, set forth above, and Article 52. The latter reads as follows:
Article 52 ~ General protection of civilian objects 1. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 29 Article 52, in essence, provides a two~pronged test for whether objects are military objectives. The first prong is that they must, by their "nature, location, purpose or use," make an effective contribution to military action. The second is that their total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization must, in the prevailing circumstances, offer a definite military advantage.
It should also be noted that in Additional Protocol I, the words "whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization" have replaced "destruction and injury," and the words "substantial, specific and immediate" of the Edinburgh Resolution have been replaced by the less specific "definite."
The term "attacks" is also used in a broader sense than is traditionally meant in military parlance, where the term was generally used to describe the use of military force in an offensive action, particularly the launching of weapons against the enemy. As defined in Article 49, " 'Attacks' means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offense or in defense."
Although the section of Additional Protocol I concerned with attacks does not apply to naval warfare, except insofar as attacks from the sea or air may affect the civilian population, individual civilians, or civilian objects on land,30 many modern navies have the capability and are often employed to conduct attacks on land targets by naval artillery or missiles or by their air arms. Thus, this section of the Protocol is explicitly applicable to this aspect of naval warfare.
For armed conflict at sea generally, however, there has been no modern counterpart to the codification effort reflected in the events leading up to and the convening of the Diplomatic Conference which resulted in the two Additional Protocols of 1977. Consequently, there has been no explicit incorporation of the principle of the military objective into conventional law applicable to armed conflicts at sea. The closest approach to that process has been the series of Round Tables convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law of San Remo, Italy, from 1988 to 1994, whose purpose was to provide a contemporary restatement of international law applicable in armed conflicts at sea. 31 The Manual that resulted from the deliberations of the Round Tables was not envisaged as a draft convention but was viewed by participants in   the Round Tables as a modern (b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such, and (c) That a distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the civilians be spared as much as possible. 42 As we have seen, incorporation in national military manuals is a strong indication that a normative principle has matured into customary internationallaw. 43 442. Military objectives are armed forces-including paratroops in descent but not crew members parachuting from an aircraft in distress-and objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage. 44 The Australian Operations Law Manual for air commanders contains similar provisions:
An aerial attack must be directed against military objectives. . . . Military objectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action. To be lawful, any attack on such objective should result in a definite military advantage. 45 The Canadian Draft Manual also adopts the Protocol definition of military objective essentially verbatim. It provides:
Military objectives are combatants and in so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
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Two United States manuals are also pertinent to our inquiry, those of the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps/Coast GuardY Although predating the actual signing of Additional Protocol I by one year, the United States Air Force operational law manual apparently took into account the ongoing negotiations in the CDDH, for its provisions on the principle of distinction and the military objective are taken almost verbatim from the final provisions of the Protocol. It provides:
In order to insure respect and protection for the civilian population and civilian objects the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against military objectives. Attacks must be strictly limited to military objectives. Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their own nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definite military advantage. 48 
Military Objective
The Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard Manual, the most recent revision of which is dated 1995, although pointing out that the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol 1,49 nevertheless has also adopted, with one variation, the Protocol formulation of the principle of the military objective. It states, in a chapter entitled "The Law of Targeting":
Only military objectives may be attacked. Military objectives are combatants and those objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, effectively contribute to the enemy's war,fighting or war,sustaining capability and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack. 50 The emphasized part of the foregoing quotation was the object of considerable debate in the San Remo Round Table, which specifically rejected it in favor of the formulation in article 52 of Additional Protocol 1. As stated by Louise Doswald, Beck, who acted as rapporteur for the sessions of the Round Table] felt that the Handbook does not take into account developments in the law relating to target discrimination since the Second World War. In particular, they feared that "war,sustaining" could too easily be interpreted to justify unleashing the type of indiscriminate attacks that annihilated entire cities during that war. 51 An annotation to a previous edition of the Commander's Handbook stated that, "This variation of the definition contained in Additional Protocol I, Article 52 (2) is not intended to alter its meaning, and is accepted by the United States as declarative of the customary rule.,, 52 In the new revision of the Annotated Supplement, the annotation is revised to state that, "This definition is accepted by the United States as declarative of the customary rule.,, 53 The inference that one may draw from this change in wording is that the United States (at least its naval arm) has rejected the presumptively narrower definition contained in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I in favor of one that, at least arguably, encompasses a broader range of objects and products. In justifying this position, the Annotated Supplement cites the American Civil War,era decision of the United States with respect to the destruction of raw cotton within Confederate territory, the sale of which provided funds for almost all Confederate arms and ammunition, as well as the twelve "target sets" for the offensive air campaign of Operation Desert Storm. 54 The text of the Handbook itself states that, "Economic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy's war,fighting capability may also be attacked.,,55
From the foregoing, it would appear that there is a consensus, in which the United States concurs, that the principle of the military objective has become a part of customary international law for armed conflict at sea, as well as on the land and in the air. We shall in the next section examine what objects the term "military objective" embraces and attempt to discern whether the variation in terminology in the U.S. naval manual does in fact suggest a broadening of the scope of permissible targets for attack.
The "Reach" of the Term, "Military Objective"
In earlier centuries, when wars were generally fought with limited objectives and the cleavage between armed forces and the civilian population was clear, the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects was reasonably apparent. Only in the immediate vicinity of the battle was the civilian populace put in jeopardy by the fire of the contending armed forces. The problem of protecting objects which were not legitimate military objectives could be met by prohibitory rules exempting particular categories of objects, buildings, or installations such as churches, hospitals, buildings used for charitable or scientific purposes, etc. This was the pattern followed in the Hague Rules, for example. 56 In modem warfare, however, with the tremendous increase in the range and sophistication of weapons and with the mobilization of the populace in support of modem armies, navies, and air forces, the cleavage is not nearly so distinct. In the two World Wars of this century, the economies of all of the major parties involved were completely mobilized in support of the war effort. Nearly all industries were converted to war production; all power,generating stations provided power for war industries; and the bulk of the adult population was engaged in some activity connected with the war effort. At the same time, the capabilities of the contending forces to strike targets deep in enemy territory, primarily through their air forces, were vastly expanded. As a result, both Allied and Axis powers conducted "strategic" bombing campaigns against the industrial bases of their enemies which, because of the limitations at that time on the accuracy of nighttime and high, altitude bombing, could hardly be said to have discriminated between valid military objectives and the civilian population and civilian objects in the vicinity of the military objective that was the target of the bombing. 57
Nevertheless, most twentieth, century international conflicts, particularly those occurring since World War II, have not been of the magnitude and geographic scale of the two World Wars. Most were undeclared and fought with limited objectives. Although geographically confined to relatively small areas, the fighting was just as intense as in the two World Wars. The Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars in which the United States was engaged were certainly intense but had little if any physical effect Gn populations and objects outside the immediate area of conflict. The Falklands/Malvinas war between Great Britain and Argentina was likewise limited. The differences in the intensity and scope of conflicts have led some commentators to suggest that there should be a flexible definition of the military objective, allowing it to expand and contract "according to the intensity, duration, subjects, and location of the armed conflict."s8 Both Additional Protocol I and the San Remo Manual reject this idea, providing that the same criteria apply in general and limited wars, although the San Remo Manual "Explanation" recognizes that "the application of these rules to the facts should result in a more restrictive approach to targeting in limited conflicts.,, 59 Rather than follow the traditional pattern of establishing prohibitory rules setting forth what objects were to be protected from hostile action, however, the conference at which the 1977 Additional Protocols were negotiated adopted a formula that provides criteria by which a responsible military commander can determine, under the circumstances existing at the time, which objects are legitimate targets for attack. As we have seen earlier, this resulted in the two,pronged test of Article 52, namely, that, to constitute military objectives, objects must, by their "nature, location, purpose or use" make an effective contribution to military action and that their total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization must, in the prevailing circumstances, offer a definite military advantage. Since this approach was a departure from the traditional practice of writing prohibitory rules specifying which objects were to be spared, it met considerable opposition at the outset of the negotiations in the CDDH.60 This opposition was eventually overcome by inclusion of the first sentence of Article 52, which, in the traditional codification pattern, is prohibitory in nature, albeit without listing exempt objects specifically. The second sentence, upon which we shall focus our discussion, gives the commander a two' prong test for determining which targets are legitimate.
The first prong of the Article 52 test, as well as the San Remo test, states four conditions-nature, location, purpose, use-which, if they make an effective contribution to military action, make an object a military objective. Some objects, "by their nature," are military objectives and remain so at all times, regardless of their location or use. Examples of such objects include enemy warships, military aircraft (unless exempt under some specific exception such as those applicable to medical transports), stocks of ammunition, and combatant personnel. 61 On the other hand, the vast majority of objects become military objectives only during the time that their particular location, purpose, or use provides an effective contribution to military action. Civilian buildings, for example, may become military objectives if they are being used by enemy troops for shelter. Their "location" may make them military objectives if they obstruct the field of fire for attack on another valid military objective. Factories making civilian goods are not normally military objectives, but if they are converted to manufacture war goods, their purpose and use may make them military objectives. The ICRC Commentary suggests that "purpose is concerned with the intended future use of an object, while that of use is concerned with its present function."62 Civilian transportation hubs may also be important military transportation links, and their dual use (civilian/military) does not exempt them from becoming military objectives, although under these circumstances the time of attack should be taken into account to minimize civilian casualties. 63 Bothe et al. state succinctly:
The objects classified as military objectives under this definition include much more than strictly military objects such as military vehicles, weapons, munitions, stores of fuel and fortifications. Provided the objects meet the two-pronged test, under the circumstances ruling at the time (not at some hypothetical future time), military objectives include activities providing administrative and logistical support to military operations such as transportation and communications systems, railroads, airfields and port facilities and industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the armed conflict. 64 The second aspect of the first prong of the te::t which must be examined is whether the nature, location, purpose, or use of the object makes an effective contribution to "military action." As we saw above, the u.s. naval
Commander's Handbook substitutes the phrase "enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability" for "military action." Is there an actual substantive difference in meaning, or is there merely a difference in perception?
Any difference between the two formulations would seem to come down to the term "war-sustaining" in the Commander's Handbook. The term "war-fighting" is equivalent to the Additional Protocol I term "military action." On the other hand, "war-sustaining" implies something not quite so directly connected with the actual conduct of hostilities.
The San Remo Round 
This explanation does not differ materially from the authoritative interpretation of Article 52(2) by Bothe et al., who suggest:
Military objectives must make an "effective contribution to military action." This does not require a direct connection with combat operation such as is implied in Art. 51, para. 3, with respect to civilian persons who lose their immunity from direct attack only while they "take a direct part in hostilities." Thus a civilian object may become a military objective and thereby lose its immunity from deliberate attack through use which is only indirectly related to combat action, but which nevertheless provides an effective contribution to the military phase of a Party's overall war effort. 66 The San Remo Manual, although adopting the Article 52(2) phrasing, nevertheless acknowledged that a civilian object may become a military objective and thereby lose its immunity from deliberate attack through use which is only indirectly related to combat action, but which nevertheless provides an effective conttibution to the military part of a party's overall war-fighting capability.67
Probably the only point of difference between the San Remo formulation (which adopts the Article 52(2) phrasing) and that in the Commander's Handbook is with respect to attacks on exports that may be the sole or principal source of financial resources for a belligerent's continuation of its war effort. In support of the possible legitimacy of such attacks, the Commander's Handbook cites the denial of claims for destruction of British,owned cotton exports from the Confederacy during the American Civil War by an Anglo,American arbitration tribunal. 6S It also raises the question whether Iraq's attacks on tankers carrying oil from Iran during the 1980,88 Gulf War may have been justified under the same theory, although it admits that the law on this subject "is not firmly settled." 69 The San Remo Round Table, however, firmly rejected the broadening of the military objective to include such targets, "because the connection between the exports and military action would be too remote.,,70
The second prong of the two,part test provided in Article 52(2)-that the total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization of the object, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage-although incorporated in haec verba in the various national manuals and the San Remo Manual, has received little attention from commentators. Bothe et al. provide the seminal commentary on the subject, stating:
The term military advantage involves a variety of considerations, including the security of the attacking force. Whether a definite military advantage would result from an attack must be judged in the context of the military advantage anticipated from the specific military operation of which the attack is a part considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or particular parts of that operation. It is not necessary that the contribution made by the object to the Party attacked be related to the advantage anticipated by the attacker from the destruction, capture or neutralization of the object. 71 Although Article 51, paragraph (1) (b) and Article 57, paragraph 2 (a) (iii) use the more restrictive term "concrete and direct" military advantage, the documents of the CDDH do not disclose the reasons for using different expressions.
72 Examining the context of the expressions in the three articles, however, it appears that the purpose of using the arguably more restrictive phrase, "concrete and direct," in Articles 51 and 57 was to provide a less subjective test for applying the rule of proportionality where there was a danger of civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects in a projected attack. 73 On the other hand, Article 52, paragraph 2 is concerned only with defining what objects are military objectives. Of course, should the attack on a legitimate military objective involve the possibility of collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects, the arguably more stringent restriction would apply.
Military Objective
The Application of the Principle of the Military Objective to Armed Conflict at Sea
As we have seen above, the term "military objective" received no precise definition in a treaty document until 1977, when Additional Protocol I included one for armed conflict on land (and for attacks on land targets by naval or air forces). 74 Although this definition does not apply of its own force to
States not party to the 1977 Protocol, we have also seen that the principle of the military objective, essentially as articulated in the Protocol, has been acknowledged to have been assimilated into customary internationallaw. 75 There also seems to be no question that it is also a principle of the law of armed conflict applicable to armed conflict at sea. 76
Despite its relatively recent articulation in its present terminology as a concrete principle of the law of armed conflict at sea,77 the concept of the military objective, often referred to as the "law of targeting" or a subdivision thereof,78 is reflected in many of the customary rules that have developed in the conduct of naval warfare over the past two centuries-particularly those that apply to what has come to be known as economic warfare.
Just as in land warfare, in warfare at sea, whether a person or object is a legitimate object of attack or is protected from attack depends, in the case of persons, on whether they are combatants or noncombatants (or civilians in the words of Additional Protocol I), and in the case of objects, on whether or not they make an effective contribution to the enemy's war effort (military action in the words of Protocol; war,fighting or war,sustaining capability in the words of the Commander's Handbook). Prior to the twentieth century, the distinction was relatively clear. Warships and naval auxiliaries were legitimate objects of attack. Merchant ships and their crews, whether enemy or neutral, were not.
On the other hand, private property at sea had never had the protection from seizure by the enemy that it enjoyed in land warfare. Under the doctrines of blockade and contraband, goods destined for (and in the case of blockade, being shipped from) an enemy port were subject to capture and condemnation by prize courts. The traditional method of enforcing these doctrines was to stop a suspect merchantman and exercise the right of visit and search. Only if the vessel resisted visit and search, was sailing in an enemy convoy, or attempted to run a blockade was it subject to attack.
The advent of the submarine and aircraft and the measures adopted by the adversaries to counteract these new means of naval warfare changed the traditional law fort>ver and irrevocably. Neither submarines nor aircraft were capable of conducting visit and search in the traditional manner. As a consequence, in World War I, German submarines (and to a limited extent aircraft) attacked enemy and neutral merchant ships without warning. The Allied forces in tum armed their merchantmen, formed them into escorted convoys, and generally incorporated their merchant fleets into the war effort. During the interwar period, the former Allied States sought to outlaw the use of submarines as commerce raiders through a series of diplomatic moves, culminating in the London Protocol of 1936,79 which purported to apply the same rules to submarines that were applicable to surface warships. These diplomatic efforts proved fruitless, however, and World War II saw a repetition of the practices of World War I in an even more widespread and cruel manner. so As a result of the practices of both the Axis and Allied powers in World War II, and the assessment of those practices by the Nuremberg Tribunal in the case of Admiral Karl Doenitz,81 a consensus seems to have been achieved among publicists and national military manuals that although the 1936
London Protocol retains its validity, the realities of modem warfare, particularly global warfare, make it inapplicable in most situations. This consensus is perhaps best expressed in the recent San Remo Manual, which provides that enemy merchant ships may be attacked only if they have become military objectives and states that the following activities may render them military objectives:
(a) engaging in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy, e.g., laying mines, minesweeping, cutting undersea cables and pipelines, engaging in visit and search of neutral merchant vessels or attacking other merchant vessels; (b) acting as an auxiliary to an enemy's armed forces, e.g., carrying troops or replenishing warships;
(c) being incorporated into or assisting the enemy's intelligence gathering system, e.g., engaging in reconnaissance, early warning, surveillance, or command, control and communications missions; (f) being armed to an extent that they could inflict damage to a warship; this excludes light individual weapons for the defense of personnel, e.g., against pirates, and purely deflective systems such as 'chaff; (g) otherwise making an effective contribution to military action, e.g., carrying military materials.
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Other manuals state the rules somewhat differently, but in essence prescribe similar standards.
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The San Remo Manual treats neutral merchant vessels separately, excluding being armed from the list of activities rendering them military objectives and adding refusal to stop or resisting visit, search, and capture. 84 The Manual explicitly states that the mere fact that a neutral vessel is armed does not provide ground 'for attack. 8s The U.S. manual is the most permissive of the manuals examined in that it includes, as a final activity, authorizing attack on enemy merchant vessels: ... "If integrated into the enemy's war,fighting!war,sustaining effort and compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.,,86 This latter provision has been subjected to severe criticism by Frits Kalshoven, who points out that the adoption of Additional Protocol I in 1977 vindicated the view, at least for land warfare, that contribution to the "war effort" is too broad a test for determining whether an object has become a military objective. He suggests that the same should be true in naval warfare.
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When the development of aircraft technology reached the point at which air transportation became a factor in international commerce, the international community attempted to adopt the same principles for civil aircraft that were applicable to merchant ships. This was first manifested in the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare,88 which, with respect to civil aircraft, closely mimic the rules applicable to merchant ships.89 Although the Hague Rules were never adopted in binding form, they have influenced the development of the law in this field, and the military manuals generally follow the pattern established in 1923. They have likewise adopted the view that activities conducted by them similar to those that would make merchant ships military objectives would also convert civil aircraft into military objectives. Again, turning to the San Remo Manual as the typical manifestation of this pattern, it provides that aircraft engaging in any of the following activities will render them military objectives:
(a) engaging in acts of war on behalf of the enemy, e.g., laying mines, minesweeping, laying or monitoring acoustic sensors, engaging in electronic warfare, intercepting or attacking other civil aircraft, or providing targeting information to enemy forces; (b) acting as an auxiliary aircraft to an enemy's armed forces, e.g., transporting troops or military cargo, or refueling military aircraft;
(c) being incorporated into or assisting the enemy's intelligence-gathering system, e.g., engaging in reconnaissance, early warning, surveillance, or command, control and communications missions;
(d) flying under the protection of accompanying enemy warships or military aircraft;
(e) refusing an order to identify itself, divert from its track, or proceed for visit and search to a belligerent airfield that is safe for the type of aircraft involved and reasonably accessible, or operating fire control equipment that could reasonably be construed to be part of an aircraft weapon system, or on being intercepted clearly manoeuvring to attack the intercepting belligerent aircraft;
(f) being armed with air-to-air or air-to-surface weapons; or (g) otherwise making an effective contribution to military action.
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Because attacks on civil airliners are likely to cause injury or death to embarked civilians, they are exempted from attack while in flight, except in situations in which their conduct is clearly hostile.91
A s we have seen, the principle of the military objective, though slow in coming to recognition as articulated in Additional Protocol I and current military manuals, has been imbedded in the law of armed conflict for several centuries. It appeared in numerous nineteenth and twentieth century documents in the form of prohibitions against attacks against certain categories of persons and objects such as undefended towns, churches, hospitals, historic buildings, noncombatant personnel, and combatant personnel who were hors de combat. The 1977 Protocol led the way in converting the principle from a list of prohibited targets to a more usable concept for a military commander in appraising whether a particular object or person could be lawfully attacked. Both the old-style negative list of prohibited targets and the new-style' permissive principle of defining the military objective have their drawbacks. The former allowed the literal-minded commander to assume that unless a prospective target was on the prohibited list, he could attack it, perhaps downplaying the related principles of collateral damage, avoiding causing unnecessary suffering, etc. The two' prong test of the latter gives the commander a great deal more discretion and requires the commander to balance the value of the target against the military advantage to be gained from its destruction or capture, obviously importing the relative question of proportionality into the equation. It must be remembered, however, that the old prohibitions have not been excised by the adoption of the new standard of the military object. They remain in effect in the various Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the treaties for the protection of artistic, scientific, and historic monuments and institutions. 92 When properly applied, the two' prong test adds an additional layer of protection to those objects and persons who should not and do not constitute legitimate military objectives.
The general acceptance of the principle of the military objective into customary intemationallaw, essentially as articulated in Additional Protocol I, marks a step forward in promoting the humanitarian goals represented in the law of armed conflict. 21. In essence, this continued the dichotomy between the so-called "Hague" law {means and methods of war} and the "Geneva" law (protection of victims of war). This dichotomy was obliterated in the Additional Protocols of 1977, which included provisions dealing with means and methods of warfare, as well as those designed to further the protection of victims. This development, among others, has led the International Court ofJustice to conclude that, "These two branches of the law applicable in armed conflict have become so closely interrelated that they are considered to have gradually formed one single complex system, known today as international humanitarian law. Defense, in a letter concurred in by the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, stated that the requirement that there be an "immediate" military advantage for destruction of an object for it to be classified as a military objective does not reflect "the law of armed conflict that has been adopted in the practice of States." Letter 27. These include Article 51 (protection of the civilian population), Article 53 (protection of cultural objects and places of worship), Article 54 (protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population), Article 55 (protection of the natural environment) j Article 56 (protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces, such as darns, dikes, and nuclear electrical generating stations), Article 57 (precautions in attack, in particular, measures to avoid collateral damage), and Article 58 (precautions against effects of attacks by the party under attack, such as relocating civilians in the area, etc.) 28. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, arts. 48 & 52. Article 52 contains a third paragraph, which reads as follows: "In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used." It has been omitted from the text since it does not form a part of the definition of a military objective, but rather provides a rule ofinterpretation for the commander ordering or executing an attack. 55. Id . para. 8.1.1. The annotation further states that, "Whether this rule permits attacks on war-sustaining cargo carried in neutral bottoms at sea, such as by Iraq on the tankers carrying oil exported by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, is not firmly settled. Authorization to attack such targets is likely to be reserved to higher authority." Id. at note 11. In this respect, Ms. Doswald-Beck states that participants in the San Remo Round Table " indicated that the sinking during the Iran-Iraq War, albeit not as frequent as those during the Second World War, should not be seen as the most significant precedent for an assessment of contemporary law, in view of the extent of violations of international humanitarian law during that conflict generally and the protests that ensued." Doswald-Beck, supra note 51, at 200.
56. See, e.g., Hague IV, supra note 14, art. 27; Hague IX, supra note 15, art. 5.
57. According to a 1940 British study of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command night operations, "two-thirds of all aircrews were missing their targets by over 5 miles." AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 48, para. 5-4d. Even the so-called "precision" daylight bombing by the U.S. Eighth Air Force was precise only in comparison to the night bombing by the British bomber force. According to an Eighth Air Force study, for the September to December 1944 period, only 22 percent of all visually dropped bombs hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point, while only two percent of bombs dropped using blind navigational techniques or radar bombing fell within 1,000 feet of their target. RICHARD HALLlON, STORM OVER IRAQ: AIR POWER AND THE GULF WAR 11-12, note 26 (1992), quoting USAAF, AAF Bombing Accuracy Report #2 (Eighth Air Force Operational Research Section, 1945), Chart 2, "Distribution of Effort and Results." 58. Hamilton DeSaussure, conference remarks, in Sixth Annual Conference, supra note 40, at 512; see also Burrus Carnahan at 516. The United States Air Force manual seems to give some credence to this idea, at least with respect to attacks on civU aircraft, stating, "As a practical matter, the degree of protection afforded to civil aviation and the potential military threat represented, varies directly with the intensity of the conflict." AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 48, para. 4-3b.
